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This working paper1 provides an overview and basic descriptive analysis of key indicators of 
national labour markets and welfare states in the European Union (EU). The overview of 
labour market indicators uses standard variables and “off-the-shelf” data provided by 
Eurostat and the OECD. Our discussion of national welfare states draws on a range of 
indicators specifically coded for the REMINDER project and compiled into a new dataset 
called “Social Protection in Europe Database” (SPEUDA). The aim of the deliverable is to 
support two different work packages within the larger REMINDER research project by 
providing institutional and other indicators to be used in subsequent analyses. Work 
package 7 investigates the role of variations in formal and informal national institutions 
(specifically labour markets; welfare states; and normative attitudes to welfare, work, 
Europe, and immigration) in explaining divergent national policy positions among EU 
countries on reforming the current rules for the free movement of labour in the EU (see 
Ruhs and Palme 2018).2 Work Package 4 investigates the fiscal effects of EU mobility and the 
consequences of differences in national institutions (see Nyman and Ahlskog 2018).3 
  
                                                     
1 This working paper is a revised version of ‘Deliverable 7.1 of the REMINDER project, first 
submitted in December 2017.  The authors would like to thank Anton Ahlén, Carolina 
Janson, and Sverker Sjöstrand for excellent research assistance. 
2 A description of the larger project can be found here: https://www.reminder-
project.eu/publications/work-packages/wp7-politics-and-institutions/ 





The free movement of workers is one of the fundamental freedoms of the European Union 
(EU).  Under the current rules for “free movement”, EU citizens can move and take up 
employment in any other EU country and – as long as they are ‘workers’ – enjoy full and 
equal access to the host country’s welfare state benefits. In recent years, free movement 
has generated considerable political conflicts between and within EU member states. Some 
EU countries have argued for more restricted access for EU workers to welfare benefits, 
while many others have opposed these calls for new restrictions. It is important to analyse 
whether and how these political conflicts are related to variations in national institutions, 
including welfare state and labour market institutions, across EU countries (cf. Ruhs and 
Palme 2018).  
The aim of this working paper is to conceptualize, operationalize, present, and discuss 
indicators for the measurement of national labour market and welfare state institutions 
among countries in the EU/EEA area. The paper is a ‘building block’ intended to support the 
overarching purpose of work packages WP7 and WP4 of the REMINDER project, namely, to 
analyse how institutional factors are related to the “national policy positions” of EU 
member states on reforming the free movement of labour in the European Union (WP7), as 
well as to the fiscal effects of EU immigration, including EU migrants’ access and use of 
welfare state benefits and services (WP4). In this paper, we are developing indicators of 
welfare states and labour markets that, in the future, will be included in such broader 
analyses. While the conceptual framework presented in Ruhs and Palme 2018 (Deliverable 
7.3) considers how national institutions may interact with the scale, composition and effects 
of migration/mobility and spill over to conflictual politics around free movement, the focus 
in this deliverable is solely on measuring the key features of national labour markets and 
welfare state institutions (what we call “formal institutions”). Indicators of informal 
institutions – specifically normative attitudes to welfare and work, Europe, immigration and 




Labour markets  
This part of the paper provides an overview of key indicators and basic differences of 
national labour markets and their regulations across EEA countries. The aim is not to 
provide a comprehensive discussion of labour markets in each Member State but to begin 
to identify major variations that may play a role in influencing and explaining the divergent 
national policy positions on free movement across EU member states (see the theoretical 
discussion in Ruhs and Palme 2018, especially section 3). We focus on two sets of 
characteristics of national labour markets: (i) work, pay and educational attainment of the 
working-age population; and (ii) labour market regulations. Our analysis considers cross-
country differences in these indicators in the most recent year for which data are available 
(usually 2016 or 2015) as well as changes over time (comparing 2002 or another year in the 
early 2000s with 2016 or 2015).  
The data used in this section are taken from two major and widely used sources. Our 
analysis of work, pay and education relies on data from the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) 
as provided by ‘Eurostat’, the statistical office of the European Union (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database ). The EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) is the 
largest European household sample survey, providing quarterly and annual data on labour 
participation of people aged 15 and over and on persons outside the labour force. It covers 
33 countries, providing Eurostat with data from national labour force surveys: the 28 
Member States of the European Union, three EFTA countries (Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland), and two EU candidate countries, i.e. the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and Turkey.4 Our analysis in this section includes all EU member states as well as 
the three EFTA countries.   
The analysis of national labour market regulations relies on relevant data from Eurostat (e.g. 
on minimum wages) as well as on indicators of union density, collective bargaining, and 
employment protection provided by the OECD (see 
http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/onlineoecdemploymentdatabase.htm ).  The 
                                                     





OECD’s employment protection indicators are well known and widely used in the 
comparative analyses of national labour market regulations.  
Work, pay and skills 
Labour market participation and employment: EU28 and EU15  
 
Considering the EU as a whole, activity rates (defined as the share of the working-age 
population that is economically active, i.e. employed or unemployed) have increased 
considerably from under 70 percent in the early 2000s to over 72 percent in 2016. As shown 
in Figure 1, activity rates in the EU15 have been higher than in other EU member states 
throughout this period. Activity rates stabilised (but did not decline) during 2008-2011, the 
three years following the onset of the financial crisis.  Employment rates (defined as the 
share of the working-age population in employment), also increased since the early 2000s, 
but they experienced considerable declines during 2008-2013 before recovering to pre-crisis 
levels of about 65% in 2015-2016.           
Figure 1: Activity rates and employment rates, EU28 and EU15, 2002-2016  
 























































































As expected, the economic crisis led to a considerable increase in the average 
unemployment rate, from 7 percent in 2008 to 11 percent in 2013 (see Figure 2). As 
European economies have begun to recover, average unemployment rate has been 
declining over the past few years but, at over 8 percent in the EU28 (and over 9 percent in 
the EU15), in 2016 it was still above pre-crisis levels.  Self-employment rate (defined as the 
share of people in employment who are self-employed) has remained relatively stable at 
around 14 percent on average. Self-employment has been more common in the new EU 






Figure 2: Unemployment rates and self-employment rates, EU28 and EU15, 2002-2016 
 
Source: EU-LFS (Eurostat) 
 
In contrast to the relatively stable share of self-employment throughout the EU, part-time 
employment has increased considerably since the early 2000s, in both the EU15 and the 
EU28 as a whole. As shown in Figure 3 below, part-time employment in the EU15 has been 
considerably higher than in the EU28 and the gap has grown over time. The share of 
temporary employees (defined as employees with contracts of a limited duration) increased 
in the early/mid 2000s, before declining and remaining relatively stable since 2009, at about 

























































































Figure 3: Part-time employment and temporary employees, EU28 and EU15, 2002-2016  
 
Source: EU-LFS (Eurostat);  
Note: The figure shows part-time employment (and temporary employees) as a share of total 
employment (and all employees).   
 
Figures 4 and 5 provide “big-picture” overviews of changes in employment by broad 
economic sector and occupation. Over two-thirds of employment in the EU is in the service 
sector, a quarter in industry, and around 5 percent in agriculture.  As expected, employment 
in services increased over time, industrial employment declined, and agricultural 
employment remained relatively constant. Compared to the EU15, employment in the more 
recent EU member states is characterised by higher shares of agriculture and industry and 
lower shares in the service sector. As expected, employment in the highest-skilled 
occupations increased while employment in medium (including some lower-skilled) 
occupations has declined since the early 2000s. Interestingly, the share of people in the 
lowest-skilled occupations (i.e. elementary occupations) has remained constant at around 
10 percent. As expected, compared to the recent EU member states, in the EU15 there are 
greater shares of people in higher-skilled jobs and lower shares in medium/lower-skilled 
jobs.  The share of employed people in the lowest skilled jobs is very similar in the EU15 and 























































































Figure 4: Employment by broad economic sector, EU28 and EU15, 2008-2016  
 
Source: EU-LFS (Eurostat) 
 
Figure 5: Employment by broad occupation, EU28 and EU15, 2002-2016  
 
Source: EU-LFS (Eurostat) 
Note: HS (“high-skilled” occupations) includes occupations with ISCO08 codes 1-3 (Managers; 
Professionals; and Technicians and associate professionals); MS (“medium/lower-skilled” 
occupations) includes occupations with ISCO08 codes 4-8 (Clerical support workers; Service and 
sales workers; Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers; Craft and related trades workers; 
and Plant and machine operators and assemblers); LS (“lowest-skilled” occupations) includes 
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Labour market participation and employment: Cross-country variations  
These aggregate labour market participation and employment figures for the EU as whole 
mask some considerable variations across EEA countries. As shown in Figure 6, activity rates 
range between 65 and 90 percent and employment rates range between 52 and 87 percent 
of the working age population. In the EU, the Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, and 
Norway) as well as the Netherlands, have the highest activity and employment rates 
although not as high as Switzerland and especially Iceland. The lowest employment rates 
are found in Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Croatia and Greece). While most countries 
experienced increases in activity and employment rates between 2002 and 2016 (see 
Appendix Figures A1 and A2), employment rates declined during this period in Greece (from 
58% to 52%), Cyprus (from 69% to 64%) and Portugal (from 69% to 65%), and to lesser 
extent also in Norway and Denmark.  
Figure 6: Activity rates and employment rates in EEA countries, 2016 
 


























































It follows from Figure 6 above that there are also considerable differences in unemployment 
rates across EEA countries. Importantly, most of the EEA countries with the highest 
unemployment rates in 2016 were among the EU15 including Greece (just under a quarter 
of the active population unemployed in 2016), Spain (just under a fifth), Italy (12 percent), 
Portugal (11 percent) and France (10 percent). In these four EU15 countries, unemployment 
has increased considerably since 2002. In contrast, in the early 2000s, the countries with the 
highest unemployment rates were all East European countries including Poland (20 percent 
in 2002), Slovakia (19%) and Bulgaria (17%). These East European countries experienced 
significant reductions in their unemployment rates over the past 15 years, despite the global 
economic crisis that began in 2008.  
Figure 7: Unemployment rates in EEA countries, 2002 and 2016 
 
Source: EU-LFS (Eurostat) 
 







































There are also considerable variations across EU member states with regard to the relative 
importance and trends of “atypical employment” such as self-employment, part-time 
employment and temporary employment. As shown in Figure 8 below, self-employment 
ranges from just over 5 percent (in Norway) to just under 30 percent (in Greece). The 
highest self-employment rates can be found in Southern-European countries (Greece, Italy 
and Spain) as well as some of the larger East European countries (including Poland and 
Romania where self-employment declined considerably during 2002 and 2016). Three 
Nordic countries – Norway, Denmark and Sweden – had the lowest self-employment rates 
in the EEA in 2016.     
Figure 8: Self-employment rates in EEA countries, 2002 and 2016 
Source: EU-LFS (Eurostat) 
 
 
Part-time employment and temporary employment rates mostly range between 0-30 
percent (see Figure 9 below).  The exceptions are Switzerland and the Netherlands, 
countries with very high part-time employment rates (just under 40% and 50%, 







































respectively). Most EU15 countries have considerably higher part-time employment rates 
than the more recent member states.  In most EU15 countries, part-time employment has 
grown considerably since the early 2000s. In contrast, it declined in some of the larger East 
European countries including Poland and Romania (see Appendix Figures A3 and A4).     




In most of the EU15 countries, more than 70 percent of employment is in the service sector 
(just under 80 percent in the UK, Sweden, Norway and Denmark). In contrast, services 
account for less than 60 percent of employment in many of the East European member 
states (less than 50 percent in Romania and just under 60 percent in Poland). The share of 
services in total employment has been rising in all EEA countries except for Luxembourg 
(see Figure 10). Romania, Greece and Poland have the highest agricultural employment 
shares (21 percent, 12 percent, and 10 percent, respectively) – compared to an average 3 
percent for the EU15 as a group.         
There is much less of an East-West divide when it comes to the share of employment in the 
lowest-skilled occupations (defined here as covering elementary occupations only). As 
shown in Figure 11, EU15 countries can be found both at the top of the ranking of the low-
skilled employment shares in the EEA (including Spain, Denmark and Italy) as well as at the 
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bottom (Norway and Sweden).   While the share of low-skilled employment remained 
constant for the EU as a whole, there were some large changes across different countries, 
with low-skilled shares declining in some countries (e.g. in Portugal, Malta, Estonia and 
Finland) and rising in some others (e.g. in Italy, Hungary and France).   
Figure 10: Share of employment in the service sector in EEA countries, 2008 and 2016  
 












































Figure 11: Employment in lowest-skilled occupations in EEA countries, 2002 and 2016 
 
Source: EU-LFS (Eurostat) 
 
Earnings and low-wage labour markets  
Considering the EU28 as a whole, nominal median hourly earnings increased by about 14 
percent from 2006 to 2014 (see Figure 12). The gap between hourly earnings of men and 
women remained roughly constant during this period, at about 14 percent.  Figure 13 makes 
clear the vast differences in hourly earnings across EEA countries.  Hourly earnings in 
Denmark (at the top of the ranking) are 15 times greater than in Bulgaria (at the bottom of 
the ranking). Within the EU15, hourly earnings are lowest among the Southern European 
countries and highest among the Nordic countries as well as Ireland. In most EEA countries, 
nominal earnings have grown during 2006 and 2016 but there are some exceptions 
including the UK, Iceland and Cyprus (which all recorded small declines in nominal earnings). 
The earnings gap between men and women varies considerably across countries, from over 
25% in Estonia to -2.5% (i.e. women having higher median hourly earnings than men) in 
Croatia (see Figure 14).   







































Figure 12: Median hourly earnings by gender in the EU28, 2006-2014, Euro 
 
Source: EU-LFS (Eurostat) 
 
Figure 13: Median hourly earnings in EEA countries, 2006 and 2014, Euro 






















































Figure 14: Gap between median hourly earnings of men and women, as % share of men’s earnings, 
EEA countries, 2006 and 2014 
 
Source: Based on data from EU-LFS (Eurostat) 
 
Low wage earners are defined as employees who earn less than two thirds of national 
median hourly earnings. Using this definition, the share of low-wage earners in 2016 was 
highest in Latvia, Romania and Lithuania (all about 23%) and lowest in Sweden, Belgium and 
Finland (all below 6 percent). The EU15 countries with the highest shares of low-wage 
earners are Germany, Greece, Ireland and the UK (all about or just under 22 percent in 
2016). While many countries experienced a decline in the share of low-wage workers, some 
countries, including Greece and Germany, recorded considerable growth in the relative size 
of the low-wage labour market during this period.   
 
 






































Figure 15: Low-wage earners (% of all employees) in EEA countries, 2006 and 2014  
 
Source: Based on data from EU-LFS (Eurostat) 
 
Educational attainment  
Across the EU as a whole, the share of the working-age population with lower secondary 
education or less has been declining while the share with tertiary education has been 
increasing over time (see Figure 16 below). In 2015-16 the share of the population with 
tertiary education surpassed the share with lower secondary education or less for the first 
time. There are, however, large differences in educational attainment across EEA countries. 
As shown in Figure 17, the shares of population with low levels of education are lowest in 
selected East European countries (the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovakia and Poland) and 
highest among selected Southern European EU15 countries (Portugal, Malta, Spain and 
Italy). The two countries with the highest shares of people with tertiary education are the 
UK and Ireland (38 percent in both countries) while the lowest shares of highly educated 
people can be found in Romania and Italy (around 15 percent, see Figure 18).          






































Figure 16: Educational attainment of population (15-65 years), EU28 and EU15, 2004-2016 
 
Source: EU-LFS (Eurostat) 
Notes:  
Levels 0-2: Less than primary, primary and lower secondary education   
Levels 3-4: Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education 
































Figure 17: Share of population 15-64 years with less than primary, primary or lower secondary 



































































Regulations of the labour market and employment relations  
Labour market regulations can have important impacts on employer demand for labour 
including migrant workers (Ruhs and Palme 2018). We briefly review four major types of 
indicators of labour market regulations in EEA countries: minimum wages; collective 
bargaining; trade union density; and composite employment protection indicators compiled 
and provided by the OECD.      
Minimum wages  
The majority but not all EEA countries use minimum wages to help regulate their national 
labour markets. There are no minimum wages in Denmark, Italy, Cyprus, Austria, Finland, 
Sweden, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Given the variation in hourly earnings it is not 
surprising that there is also considerable variation in minimum wages across countries, both 







































in terms of pay in Euro unadjusted for differences in living costs (see Figure 19 below) and 
Purchasing Power Standards (see Appendix Figure A10). Considering PPS, monthly minimum 
wages in Germany and the Netherland are about three and a half times larger than in 
Romania and Bulgaria. The gap is even larger when considering nominal pay unadjusted for 
cross-country differences in living costs (Figure 19). As shown in Figure 20, the share of the 
minimum wage in average earnings in some of the largest EU15 countries is fairly similar (at 
just over 40 percent in the UK and Germany) although it is lower in Spain (34 percent).     
















































Trade unions and collective bargaining 
There are large differences in trade union density, defined as the share of employees who 
are union members, and collective bargaining, across EEA countries. As shown in Figure 21 
below, union density ranges from 60-90 percent in the Nordic countries (which are classified 
as “coordinated market economies“ within the “Varieties of Capitalism” literature, see e.g. 
Hall and Soskice 2001) to 10-20 percent in selected East European member states as well as 
France. Similarly, there are vast variations in the coverage of collective bargaining, i.e. the 
process of negotiating the terms of employment (e.g. pay, working hours, holidays etc.) 
between employers and workers, which is one of the major instruments of regulating 
employment conditions. While virtually all workers are covered by collective bargaining in 
France, Austria and Belgium, fewer than a third benefit from collective bargaining in the UK 
and Ireland (two “liberal market economies“) as well as in various East European countries. 
Between the early 2000s and the mid-2010s, trade union density declined in all EEA 
countries except for Italy where it increased slightly (from 33 percent to 38 percent, see 
Appendix Figure A11). In most countries where collective bargaining was already high in the 

























early 2000s, it has remained high over the past 15 years (Appendix Figure A12). Collective 
bargaining declined in most East European countries as well as in some EU15 countries such 
as Greece, Ireland, the UK, and Germany (among others).    
Figure 21: Collective bargaining and trade union density in EEA countries, 2015 (or as indicated in 
notes below table) 
 
Source: OECD 
Notes: Poland (c 2012, t 2014); Latvia (t 2012); Estonia (t 2012); Hungary (c 2014, t 2014); UK (t 
2013); Ireland (c 2014, t 2013); Greece (c 2013, t2013); Switzerland (c 2014); Luxembourg (c 2014, t 
2014); Slovenia (t 2013); Norway (c 2014); Finland (t 2016); Iceland (c 2016, t 2013); and France (c 
2014, t 2014).  
 
 
Employment protection indicators  
The OECD‘s indicators of employment protection measure the procedures and costs 
involved in dismissing individuals or groups of workers and the procedures involved in hiring 
workers on fixed-term or temporary work agency contracts. The indicators are based on 21 
items covering three major and different aspects of employment protection regulations as 




























































dismissal of workers with regular contracts; collective dismissals; and temporary contracts.5 
The OECD indicators measure major although not all aspects of the flexibility of national 
labour markets (see the discussion in OECD 2013).  
Figure 22 uses a spider diagram to display these three indicators for EEA member states, 
focusing on the most recent data available (2013, 2014, or 2015). The scale ranges from 0 
(low protections, at the centre of the figure) to 6 (high protections, at the outer perimeter 
of the figure). Countries are ordered clockwise (and starting at “12:00 o’clock“) in terms of 
the degree of “protection of permanent workers against (individual) dismissal“, which is 
lowest in the UK, Hungary, Switzerland and Ireland, and highest in France, the Netherlands, 
the Czech Republic and Portugal. For most EEA countries, there was relatively little or no 
change in these employment protection indicators during 2002 and 2013 (see Appendix 
Figures A13-A15). There are some important exceptions from this pattern including, for 
example, Greece, Portugal and the Slovak Republic (where protections of workers on 
permanent and temporary contracts decreased considerably), as well as Germany and 
Sweden (where protections for temporary workers declined).      
  
                                                     
5 A detailed explanation of the methodology used to compile the OECD’s indicators of employment 










Notes: The data shown in this figure are based on the OECD’s revised series of the three indicators 
(covering the years 2008-2015). The time series data in Appendix Figures A13-15 are based on 
“Version” 1 of these indicators (covering a longer time period including the early 2000s).   
 
Welfare states 
This second part of the paper provides an overview of basic differences of national welfare 
state institutions across EEA countries and presents a set of indicators on social protection 
programmes. As with the section on labour markets, the aim is to begin to identify key 
variations that may influence the national policy positions on free movement across EU 
member states. The section furthermore introduces a social protection data-base called 
SPEUDA (“Social Protection in Europe Database”) that has been compiled for the REMINDER 
project.  The Appendix to this paper contains a discussion of the sources of the original data 
and a description of the variables included in the SPEUDA database. The variables in 











































programmes including Social Security Programs Throughout the World (SSPTW)6 and Mutual 
Information Systems on Social Protection (MISSOC)7, as well as on existing databases 
directly providing indicators in variable form such as Social Assistance and Minimum Income 
Protection Interim Dataset (SAMIP)8.       
Welfare state institutions are part of nation state building which suggests that any EU-
regulations in this area are likely to generate tensions. Moreover, since the Treaty of Rome 
was established in the mid-1950s the diversity of welfare states organisation in the EU has 
increased (Palme et al 2009). Considering the various sources of welfare state chauvinism, 
there are different reasons for why this large welfare state variation is potentially a very 
important factor for explaining the divergent national policy positions on reforming free 
movement among EU member states (Ruhs and Palme 2018). First, the design of the 
welfare state is one of the determinants of the fiscal effects of immigration on the host 
country. Second, different welfare systems are associated with different underlying 
principles of benefit provision with variable degrees of (in)consistency with the idea of 
“reciprocity”. Third, the current EU regulations of social rights for mobile workers are 
modelled on the continental European welfare state regime suggesting that countries with 
welfare states that differ from the Continental European welfare state model may be more 
likely to want to change the rules on free movement and access to benefits. Fourth, existing 
research on the characteristics of labour immigration policies in high-income countries 
suggests that there are significant policy co-variations across countries with different 
welfare states indicating some kind of interplay with both the labour market and 
immigration policy regimes. 
These are good reasons for us to seek to identify key variations of welfare states across EU 
countries. We suggest that the key differences in social insurance programmes, family 
policies, and health care, including the funding of the systems, are likely to have a bearing 
on “free movement” conflicts. In order to define correctly the major “policy-models” in 
these policy areas, it is of critical importance to identify the underlying principles for benefit 
                                                     
6 See https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/ 
7 See http://missoc.org/MISSOC/INFORMATIONBASE/informationBase.jsp 




provision. To measure key features of national welfare states, we will create a broad set of 
indicators based on an analysis of the social protection systems of the EEA countries 
(following Palme et al 2009, Esser et al 2013 and Palme 2015). This analysis will consider a 
range of factors such as the coverage, generosity, eligibility/contribution conditions, and the 
financing of provisions. 
The first step is to conceptualise the underlying characteristics of welfare states/social 
protection systems. We then need to operationalize concepts in order to make them 
empirically observable. The third step is to identify and measure suitable indicators of key 
dimensions of welfare states across 28 EU Member States. The fourth step is to discuss the 
observed patterns. As the primary focus of this paper is on the conceptualization, 
measurement, and identification of labour market and welfare state indicators, we limit 
ourselves to a very basic discussion of the observed patterns. Future work (specifically, 
deliverable 7.4) will analyse how the indicators of formal institutions identified in this paper 
are related to informal institutions (see Mårtensson and Uba 2018), and how they vary 
across EU countries.  
The regime approach 
In comparative welfare state research, what has been labelled the “regime approach” has 
been extraordinarily influential (e.g. Esping Andersen 1990). At the core of the regime 
approach is the creation of a taxonomy for classifying countries into categories. The 
identification of the regimes may ultimately be based on a “variable approach” (explained in 
more detail further below). In other words, the actual classification of cases into the 
identified regimes/categories can be based on the empirical measurement of some key 
variables. However, it is the categories and not the values of the underlying variables that 
are used in the subsequent regime analyses. The regime approach can be used for analysing 
how the various identified regimes are related to certain explanatory factors (driving forces 
behind regime formation), and on how differences across regimes can explain different 
outcomes including a range of economic, social, and political conditions. 
In order to bring some clarity to the complexity of social protection in the EEA, it is useful to 




categorize social policy systems naturally involves simplifications, such typologies are often 
fruitful in order to simplify complex patterns of similarities and differences. Early attempts 
to classify welfare states appear to have assumed a process of modernization from a 
residual welfare state to a more developed one (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958). More recent 
contributions have identified and emphasized the parallel and path dependent 
development of different models (Esping Andersen 1990; Korpi and Palme 1998).  
Social insurance models  
We follow the taxonomy of social policy models outlined by Korpi and Palme (1998) as a 
frame for outlining variations across countries and over time: the targeted model; the basic 
security model; the voluntary state subsidized model; the corporatist model; and the 
encompassing model. Embodied into these five models are different strategies and 
principles to determine eligibility and entitlement levels, as well as financing, factors of 
outmost importance for programme coverage and benefit generosity. An important 
advantage of this typology is that it has a strict focus on institutional aspects of the social 
protections programmes as such, and it does not confuse the institutional models, neither 
with the political driving forces nor with the intended outcomes. 
Benefits in the targeted model are typically very modest in character, providing mostly for 
the necessities of life. Living standards above the modicum are expected to be covered by 
private or occupational alternatives. In Europe the principle of low-income targeting is used 
mainly in residual areas of social protection, such as social assistance and minimum income 
benefits, and not in the core social protection programmes.  
The voluntary state subsidised form does not dominate as a social policy model in any of the 
studied countries. However, unemployment insurance in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, as 
well as sickness insurance in Switzerland follow that model. The voluntary state subsidised 
model is sometimes referred to as the “Ghent system”, after the Belgian town Ghent where 
this form of governance was first introduced. The Ghent-system is based on independent 
funds that organise social insurance for separate groups in society, typically trade union 
members, but with state financial support in addition to the contributions paid by the 
voluntary members. Unlike the state corporatist model, it does not typically include 




Social insurances of the basic security type provide relatively modest benefits, which 
typically are flat rate in character. In cases where benefits are formally earnings-related, the 
income ceiling is often too low or the graduation of benefits by income usually not sufficient 
to guarantee high degrees of income security during periods out of work. Today, two 
variants of the basic security model exist, wherein eligibility is based either on contributions 
(Ireland and the UK) or on citizenship/residence and taxation (Denmark).   
Eligibility in state corporatist systems is based on a combination of contributions and 
belongingness to specified occupational categories, and benefits are clearly earnings-
related. The earnings-related character often gives higher benefit amounts than those of 
basic security systems. This is the dominant model among the Continental European 
countries (e.g. France and Germany).  
The encompassing model combines citizenship-based universal benefits and earnings-
related entitlements for the economically active population, and therefore shares important 
features to both basic security and state corporatist programmes. This model dominates 
among the Nordic countries (e.g. Norway and Sweden). 
Social protection in Greece, Portugal and Spain, countries that began a democratic 
consolidation in the mid-1970s, share the fragmented structure of the state corporatist 
model (Katrougalos, 1996).  
It is difficult to identify a single model that characterizes social protection in the New 
Member States of Central Eastern Europe (CEE). Countries in this area have moved in 
different directions and tend to mix different principles into what has been labelled a hybrid 
model (cf. Kuitto 2015). 
In order to understand the effects of cross-national welfare state differences for free 
movement issues, it is of critical importance to recognise the importance of how the funding 
(and other qualifying conditions) of the different benefit systems is organised. The targeted 
model is typically funded by taxation. The state corporatist model is funded mainly by 
contributions from the social partners but always with state participation. The funding 
structure is also mixed in the voluntary state subsidised model. There are various different 




while others rely on taxation. The encompassing model uses taxation for basic benefits but 
social security contributions for the earnings-related benefits. 
These differences are important, not only from a financial point of view but also in terms of 
“legitimacy”. Qualifying conditions in the form of social security contributions represent an 
effective way of establishing the “deservingness” of benefit claimants (Sjöberg 2000). For 
the purpose of this work package the question of mode of financing of social protection 
systems is thus potentially of great importance. The expectation is that the more the 
systems are funded by social security contributions the stronger the link between funding 
and benefit entitlements and hence the deservingness.  
We argue in this deliverable that it is necessary to extend the regime approach, which has 
traditionally tended to be based on the characteristics of the social insurance systems, to 
also include policy areas of growing importance such as family policy and health care.  
Family policy models  
Variations in the organization of family related benefits across EU member states have 
longstanding traditions that are expressions of underlying differences in goals and values. 
This motivates an analysis of these traditions in regime terms as family policy models. While 
some countries have very modest family-related benefits and hence can be said to apply a 
market based model, other countries have much more ambitious family policies – but with 
different goals and using different policy instruments. Traditional family policy tends to be 
based on programmes that provide support to families with children in ways that facilitate a 
gendered division of market and care work between the spouses. This approach is 
commonly labelled the male-breadwinner model of family policy (common in Continental 
Europe). There is an important link in this model between the funding strategy of paying 
social security contributions and the right for the family members to derive rights from the 
fact that the worker/breadwinner pays such contributions. This is a very different logic from 
the dual-earner model (common in the Nordic countries), where family benefits and 
services are designed to provide resources and create incentives for both parents to work 
and take caring responsibilities. While there are earnings-related contributory benefits also 




mothers irrespective of their labour force attachment, which stands in contrast to the male-
breadwinner model where the one paying the contributions also receives the benefit.  
The distinction between the derived rights of the male-breadwinner model and the 
individual rights of the dual earner model can have important implications for the national 
politics of free movement, especially with regard to the issue of exporting benefits to family 
members (of mobile workers) residing abroad. The argument here is that there are different 
logics in terms of how entitlements are earned. In a male breadwinner model, the 
contributor earns social entitlements by paying contributions also for benefits that are not 
earnings-related such as child benefits. That family members may reside in other countries 
does not disturb the underlying logic of the institutional set-up. In the dual earner model, 
where rights are individual in general and child benefits are typically based on the basis of 
residence, there is no logic in paying benefits to family members who reside in another 
country.   
There tends to be a strong resemblance between the social insurance and family support 
models that individual countries have implemented: The market oriented family policy 
model is prevalent in “basic security countries”. The dual earner model is generally found 
among the “encompassing countries”. The male breadwinner model is common among the 
state corporatist countries. This suggests that effects that are expected from the policy 
design in one policy area (social insurance) will be reinforced by the same kind of models in 
other policy areas (family policies). It is also important to recognise that there are likely to 
be important interactions between social insurance and family policies on the one hand, 
and labour market institutions on the other hand, when it comes to various sort of 
outcomes (ranging from poverty and inequality to normative attitudes). 
Health care models 
While all EEA countries have comprehensive health care systems, it is important to point out 
that they differ when it comes to both financing and benefits. A basic distinction is 
commonly made between the health insurance model and the national health services 
model (cf. Wendt et al 2009). The insurance model for health care follows the same logic as 
the social insurance model for cash benefits discussed above, i.e. insured persons pay 




care systems are typically tax funded without the same link between the financing 
mechanism and how and where you are insured found in health insurance systems where 
contributions more clearly establish such a link. In a health service model, residents are not 
“contributors” by default, which might be a source for concerns about “legitimacy” given 
the wide-spread value and expectation of “reciprocity”. It thus appears fruitful to apply a 
regime approach in the health care policy area and the SPEUDA data-base includes a regime 
dummy variable that captures the difference between the health insurance model and the 
national health service model.   
There are also good reasons to look beyond health care and social protection when we are 
analysing societal regimes. Partly as a response to the almost exclusive focus on welfare 
state institutions for classifying countries, the Varieties of Capitalism school of thought has 
launched an alternative system of classification with a stronger emphasis of labour market 
regulations and educational systems (e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001). This has made a clear 
imprint on contemporary welfare state research. It is moreover of obvious relevance for the 
present project, which is dealing with the nexus between labour markets and social 
protection. The provision of different kinds of indicators for both these policy areas paves 
the way for an in-depth analysis of such interactions in future deliverables. 
The variable approach and indicators 
An alternative to the regime approach is what can be labelled the variable approach which, 
instead of working with categories, starts from the notion that more information is gained 
by measuring institutional variation with mostly continuous variables that more accurately 
capture an underlying multidimensional variation, and that allows the combinations of 
different variables in the empirical analysis. In this deliverable, we will pursue a 
“programme specific” variable approach along with the regime approach (Palme 2006). The 
programme specific variable approach has some attractive properties. First, it captures the 
variation that is specific to programmes which is helpful because in reality the various kinds 
of programmes in the different countries studied do not follow the same logic or design.  
Secondly, it allows for the creation of indices that can capture what can be expected to be 
the critical variations across countries rather than all social policy variations. Such an 




not only as part of a wider policy regime.  If we want to study attitudes to free movement-, 
for example, we may have a lot to gain from studying unemployment insurance benefits 
separated from other kinds of provisions such as old-age pensions (that tend to be very 
important for the classification of countries in regime types). Any exploration of the 
importance of specific insurance programmes should of course be guided by theoretically 
based hypotheses of why the character of a specific insurance programme would have 
consequences for the view citizens and/or politicians take on free movement, rather than 
the kinds of policy configurations that are captured by regime categories that aim to 
summarise the character of a number of social insurance branches. 
Following this logic, in the discussion below we describe the organization of social 
protection in relation to major social insurance programmes, family support programmes, 
means-tested minimum income provisions, and health care. We have selected a number of 
key indicators to describe the programmes: coverage, qualifying conditions, financing, and 
benefit levels. 
Unemployment benefits 
SPEUDA includes indicators for unemployment insurance. As described in the Appendix, the 
indicators follow a broad division into categories: coverage, qualification conditions, 
funding, and benefit generosity.  
Figure 23 displays the coverage index calculated on the basis of how many categories of 
people on the labour market are covered by unemployment insurance (for details, see 
Appendix). Most countries have had stable rules for inclusion but we can also see that a 
handful of the countries have actually included more categories over the observed period. 





Figure 23: Unemployment insurance coverage index in EEA countries, 2002 and 2014  
 
 
Note: The x-axis measures the number of categories of people covered. The list of categories is 
explained in the Appendix.   
Source: SPEUDA   
 
In unemployment insurance systems, you typically qualify by paying contributions or by 
being in insured employment for a certain period of time. Such rules have been put in place 
in order to ensure that benefit claimants have documented their willingness to work and 
would be deserving of benefit recipient (cf. Sjöberg 2000). As shown in Figure 24, the 
qualifying period for getting access to the unemployment benefit is stable in most countries. 
There are however some exceptions and about as many countries reduce the length of the 
qualifying period as there are countries prolonging it. 










































In Figures 25a and b we turn to the financing of unemployment insurance. We can see that, 
with the exception of Denmark, Estonia and Sweden, the direct state funding of this benefit 
programme is very modest. However, the figure does not tell the whole story in the sense 
that it only captures the formal rules for contributions of the insured persons, the 
employers and the state. However, the state will often cover the deficits and this is an 
aspect that is not captured by this indicator since it only reflects the formal rules. 






































Figure 25a: Unemployment insurance financing, proportion paid by the insured, employer or state in 



















































































































Insured (part of total)
Employer (part of total)




Figure 25b: Unemployment insurance financing, proportion paid by the insured, employer or state in 
EEA countries, 2002 and 2014  
 
Source: SPEUDA 
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In Figure 26 below, unemployment benefit replacement is defined in proportion to GDP per 
capita. While most countries provide benefits equal to 50 percent or more of GDP per 
capita, a number of countries have very modest unemployment benefits/replacement rates 
and here we find examples from both the old EU member states, for example the UK, and 
more recent member states, such as Malta. 
Figure 26: Unemployment insurance replacement (proportion of GDP per capita) in EEA countries, 










































In Figure 27, the duration of unemployment benefits among the EEA countries are displayed 
in number of weeks. We can observe substantial variation among European countries 
ranging from several years in Denmark to less than 20 weeks in Hungary but also that a 
handful of countries have reduced the duration since 2002. 











































Sickness cash benefit insurance 
SPEUDA includes indicators for sickness cash benefits. The indicators follow the same 
division into categories as for unemployment insurance: coverage, qualification conditions, 
funding, and benefits generosity. Figure 28 shows the same kind of coverage index as we 
displayed for unemployment insurance above. Coverage is broader for sickness cash 
benefits among European countries and is also increasing in some countries. Three new 
member states report declining coverage.  
Figure 28: Sickness cash benefit insurance coverage index in EEA countries, 2002 and 2014  
 
 
Note: The x-axis measures the number of categories of people covered. The list of categories is 










































Figure 29a: Sickness cash insurance financing, proportion paid by the insured, employer or state in 
EEA countries, 2002 and 2014  
 
Source: SPEUDA 
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Figure 29b: Sickness cash insurance financing, proportion paid by the insured, employer or state in 
EEA countries, 2002 and 2014  
Source: SPEUDA 
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Data not shown here indicate that the qualifying periods for sickness insurance tend to be 
shorter than for unemployment insurance. Indeed, in some countries coverage is more or 
less instant for those who get employed. The data on formal rules for financing of sickness 
benefits displayed in Figure 29a and b show similarities with those for unemployment 
insurance. Only a few countries have a strong reliance on tax financing of sickness benefits. 
Unsurprisingly Denmark is one of them. 
Replacement rates for sickness cash benefits tend to be higher than for unemployment 
insurance as illustrated by Figure 30, except for Ireland and the UK where they are on 
roughly the same modest level. Cross national differences are however substantial. 
Interestingly enough, we can observe declining replacement levels in a number of countries 
and where improvements are recorded they tend to be small. This is in line with the results 
reported by Palme (2015) in a study on retrenchment/expansion patterns in Europe during 
the financial crisis. Figure 31 shows remarkable stability in the duration periods in 2002 and 
2014. There are some noteworthy exceptions, though: Sweden and Ireland cut the duration 
period substantially; Croatia, Luxembourg, and Finland also reduced duration;  whereas 





Figure 30: Sickness cash benefit replacement rate in EEA countries, 2002 and 2014 
 






























































































Work accident insurance 
SPEUDA includes indicators for work accident insurance. The indicators follow the broad 
division into categories: coverage, qualification conditions, funding, and benefits generosity. 
By and large, among the EEA countries the cross-national differences are small when it 
comes to coverage, qualifying conditions and state financing of this particular programme. 
Overall there are relatively small gaps in coverage (Figure 32). There is usually immediate 
coverage for employed persons, with the employer covering the entire costs with their 
social security contributions in most countries (Figure 33a and b). Some countries, with the 
UK as a clear example, have joint funding of all social insurance programmes and that 
typically results in a mixed funding also of work accident insurance. When it comes to 
earnings replacement, however, there is a fair amount of variation. While the average 
replacement rate is higher than for the other benefits, as illustrated by Figure 34 not all 




Figure 32: Work accident insurance coverage index in EEA countries, 2002 and 2014 
 
 
Note: The x-axis measures the number of categories of people covered. The list of categories is 
explained in the Appendix.   
Source: SPEUDA 
  






































Figure 33a: Work accident insurance financing, proportion paid by the insured, employer or state in 
EEA countries, 2002 and 2014  
 
Source: SPEUDA 
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Figure 33b: Work accident insurance financing, proportion paid by the insured, employer or state in 
EEA countries, 2002 and 2014  
 
Source: SPEUDA 
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Figure 34: Work accident insurance replacement (proportion of GDP per capita) in EEA countries, 






SPEUDA includes indicators for old-age pensions. The indicators follow the same broad 
division into categories: coverage, qualification conditions, funding, and benefit generosity.  
We illustrate some of the cross-national variation by presenting data on the coverage of 
pension programmes using the same kind of index as we did for sickness and 
unemployment insurance above. Figure 35, showing the old-age pension coverage in EEA 
countries, reflects some of the underlying differences between the universal Nordic systems 
and the contributory state corporatist systems on the European continent. The Nordic 
pensions systems, but also those in the Netherlands and Switzerland, cover all permanent 






































residents and give them pension entitlements without other conditionalities. The 
contributory systems typically cover those who are active on the labour market and 
coverage will therefore be lower in such systems. Countries with a primarily contributory 
system often have minimum provisions/pensions that are of a social assistance kind, i.e. 
paid after means-testing. However, access to such minimum provisions tends to be riddled 
with different conditionalities and such benefits are therefore not rights-based in the same 
way as contributory pensions (often referred to as ‘droits acquis’) or citizenship/residence-





Figure 35: Old-age pension coverage index in EEA countries, 2002 and 2014  
 
 
Note: The x-axis measures the number of categories of people covered. The list of categories is 
explained in the Appendix.   
Source: SPEUDA  
 







































Figure 36: Old-age pension conditions (required years of contribution) for men in EEA countries, 
2002 and 2014  
 
Note: Countries where different conditions apply for women include Poland (2002, 2014), Bulgaria 
(2002, 2014), Switzerland (2002, 2014), UK (2002) and Romania (2014). 
Source: SPEUDA 
 
Figure 36 shows the required years of contribution for an earnings-related pension and 
displays large cross-national differences.  Figure 37a and b shows the distribution of formal 
financial responsibilities. 






































Figure 37a: Pension insurance financing, proportion paid by the insured, employer or state in EEA 
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Figure 37b: Pension insurance financing, proportion paid by the insured, employer or state in EEA 
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SPEUDA further includes indicators of two different kinds of family related programmes: 
maternity/parental leave benefits and family benefits. The indicators for both kinds of 
benefits follow the same broad division into categories: coverage, qualification conditions, 
funding, and benefits generosity. For reasons of space, we will focus the presentation of 
indicators on the maternity/parental leave benefits. 
The coverage index for maternity/parental leave benefits displayed in Figure 38 is 
constructed as for the other benefit programmes. It indicates a broad coverage of these 
programmes in Europe. 
Figure 38: Maternity/parental leave benefit coverage in EEA countries, 2002 and 2014  
 
 
Note: The x-axis measures the number of categories of people covered. The list of categories is 
explained in the Appendix.   
Source: SPEUDA 
 






































Figure 39 shows that qualifying periods for maternity/parental leave benefits vary quite 
substantially between EEA countries. Some countries have very short qualifying periods. A 
fairly large group of countries have qualifying periods around 26 weeks. Few countries have 
qualifying period over 40 weeks.  






The indicators for most social protection programmes indicate a modest participation of the 
state in funding social protection. As illustrated by Figure 40a and b, for maternity/parental 
leave benefits the formal rules indicate a strong presence of the state not only in Denmark, 
where the state is covering most costs in all programmes, but also in some other countries, 
such as Austria, where the state tend to play a small role. 
 






































Figure 40a: Maternity/parental leave benefit funding, proportion paid by the insured, employer or 
state in EEA countries, 2002 and 2014  
 
Source: SPEUDA 
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Figure 40b: Maternity/parental leave benefit funding, proportion paid by the insured, employer or 
state in EEA countries, 2002 and 2014  
 
Source: SPEUDA 


















































































































Insured (part of total)
Employer (part of total)




The benefit replacements reported in Figure 41 are again related to GDP per capita. They 
vary a lot between countries but the changes over time are modest with some notable 
exceptions. A handful of countries provide very generous benefits but a few countries have 
very low benefits. 
Figure 41: Maternity/parental leave benefit replacement as proportion of GDP per capita in EEA 












































Figure 42 shows that a number of countries have duration periods of one year or more but 
that a majority of the countries have shorter duration for these programmes. Almost half of 
the countries have a duration period of less than 20 weeks. Changes over time go in both 
directions. 














































Minimum benefits, aimed at providing a safety net for those who are not included or not 
adequately protected by social insurance and assimilated schemes, play a rather modest 
role in terms of overall expenditure among European welfare states (Palme et al 2009). 
Benefits also tend to be modest but the low expenditures are primarily a consequence of 
the residual nature in terms of recipiency, i.e. relatively few persons receive them. However, 
for this work package minimum benefits are of great interest (Ruhs and Palme 2018). 
SPEUDA includes a set of indicators coded using MISSOC and directly drawn from the SAMIP 
project (see Appendix). Whereas MISSOC provides indicators on qualifying conditions, the 
SAMIP based indicators are based on a so called “type case approach” which captures the 
benefit levels for different categories of households. This approach also generates indicators 
















Figure 43: Minimum income protection for a single person household without children in EEA 
countries, 2002 and 2013. The sum of social assistance standard rates for a single adult person, 
housing supplement, refundable tax credits and other benefits available for a single person 
household without children. Average monthly amounts as proportion of an average production 
worker’s wage. 
 
Note: Missing data in original source for Lichtenstein, Greece, Iceland and Croatia, as well as Italy 
and Norway for 2013 
Source: SAMIP (in SPEUDA) 






































Figure 44: Minimum income protection a two-parent family type-case in EEA countries, 2002 and 
2013. The sum of social assistance for a two-parent family with two children, child supplement, 
housing supplement, refundable tax credits and other benefits available for a two-parent family with 
two children. Average monthly amounts as proportion of an average production worker’s wage. 
 
Note: Missing data in original source for Lichtenstein, Greece, Iceland and Croatia, as well as Italy 
and Norway for 2013 
Source: SAMIP (in SPEUDA) 
 
  






































Health care indicators 
The SPEUDA data-base further includes a set of more detailed indicators that are designed 
to capture the multidimensional variation of national health systems. Coverage indicators 
provide more details about the variation in coverage of different groups (Figure 45 below). 
Funding indicators illustrate the contributions from the employers, insured persons, and the 
state but they also provide information about deficits. The qualifying conditions are 
captured by indicators on residency requirements and on minimum periods for 
qualification. Benefit indicators provides information about duration of benefits and co-
payments of different kinds. 
Figure 45: Health care coverage index in EEA countries, 2004 and 2014  
Note: The x-axis measures the number of categories of people covered. The list of categories is 
explained in the Appendix.   
Source: SPEUDA (based on MISSOC). 
 



































This working paper provides sets of indicators on labour markets and welfare state 
institutions in Europe. The indicators will inform subsequent analyses of institutional 
variations across EU countries and over time, and of the potential role of these variations in 
as sources of political conflicts between EU Member States about whether and how to 
reform the current rules for free movement (deliverables 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6 of the REMINDER 
project). The indicators will also feed into the analysis of the determinants of the fiscal 
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Appendix A: Additional Figures 
 
Figure A1: Activity rates in EEA countries, 2002 and 2016 












































Figure A2: Employment rates in EEA countries, 2002 and 2016 
 
Source: EU-LFS (Eurostat) 
 
  







































Figure A3 Part-time employment in EEA countries, 2002 and 2016 
 












































Figure A4 Temporary employment in EEA countries, 2002 and 2016 
 
Source: EU-LFS (Eurostat) 
 
  







































Figure A5: Share of employment in agriculture in EEA countries, 2002 and 2016  
 











































Figure A6: Share of employment in industry in EEA countries, 2008 and 2016  
 










































Figure A7: Share of employment in high-skilled occupations in EEA countries, 2002 and 2016 
 
Source: EU-LFS (Eurostat) 
  







































Figure A8: Share of employment in medium and lower-skilled occupations in EEA countries, 2002 
and 2016  
 
Source: EU-LFS (Eurostat) 
 
  







































Figure A9: Population (aged 15-65) with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 
education, EEA countries, 2004 and 2016 
Source: Eurostat 
  








































































Figure A11 Trade union density in EEA countries (%), 2002 and 2015 (unless indicated otherwise) 
Source: OECD 
Notes: The years in parentheses indicated the years of the observations (early 2000s, mid 2010s). 
observations for countries without parentheses refer to 2002 and 2015  
 
  

































Figure A12 Collective bargaining (% employees covered) in EEA countries, 2002 and 2015 (unless 
indicated otherwise) 
Source: OECD 
Notes: The years in parentheses indicated the years of the observations (early 2000s, mid 2010s). 
observations for countries without parentheses refer to 2002 and 2015  
 
  







































































































Figure A15: Strictness of employment protection in 2013 and 2002 – collective dismissals (additional 
restrictions) 
Source: OECD   































Appendix B: The Social Protection in Europe Database (SPEUDA) 
Introduction 
This Appendix  provides basic information about SPEUDA, the data-base of social protection 
indicators that has been compiled within work package 7 of the REMINDER project. The 
multitude of indicators included in SPEUDA reflects the multidimensionality of welfare state 
(social protection) institutions. The data-base contains comparative and longitudinal data on 
social protection programmes in 28 European Union (EU) member states and four European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries. It includes indicators for new indicators that we 
constructed based on existing indicators taken from legal compilations and other existing 
data-sets for social protection institutions in 32 European countries. The dataset - SPEUDA - 
includes factors such as coverage, eligibility, qualifying conditions, generosity and funding of 
social protection programmes. 
 
Social protection programmes and institutional characteristics covered 
The data-base comprises information about seven social protection programmes: 
Unemployment insurance, Work injury insurance, Sick-cash benefits, Old age pensions, 
Parental leave/Maternity benefits, Family allowances and Health care, as well as protection 
measurements regarding guaranteed minimum income (safety nets). In general, the social 
protection programmes are systems designed to protect individuals against interruption or 
loss of earnings (and may include additional compensations for certain expenditures). 
Regarding minimum incomes, the data-base includes measurements on the generosity of 
means-tested and other targeted benefits for individuals and families in need of social 
assistance. Within each programme, the indicators are structured according to fixed 




The indicators in the SPEUDA database are coded on the basis of data and information 
taken from the existing sources listed below: 





This legislative information presented in a standardized format has been used to collect 
information about the following social protection programmes: 
Unemployment 
Compensation for the loss of income resulting from involuntary unemployment. 
Work injury 
Compensation for work-connected injuries and occupational illnesses 
Sick pay 
Sickness benefits, which are paid when short term illnesses prevent work 
Old age 
Benefits providing pensions or lump-sum payments to compensate for loss of work-related 
income resulting from old age or permanent retirement 
Parental leave (maternity/paternity) 
Prenatal, obstetric, and postnatal care for working parents 
Family allowance 
Additional income for families with young children to meet part of the added costs of their 
support 
Mutual Information Systems on Social Protection (MISSOC): 
Source: http://missoc.org/MISSOC/INFORMATIONBASE/informationBase.jsp 
The database has been used to collect information about the following social protection 
systems: 
Health care 




Guaranteed minimum resources 
Eligibility standards for social security assistance 
Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Interim Dataset (SAMIP): 
Source: http://www.spin.su.se/datasets/samip 
The database has been used to collect information about the following social protection 
system: 
Guaranteed minimum resources 
Means-tested benefits calculated for three typical households; a single person, a lone 
parent, and a two parent family. 
World Bank Open Data: 
Data on GDP per capita and GNI per capita are collected from the World Bank Open Data. 
Source: http://data.worldbank.org/ 
ILOSTAT: 
Data on average incomes are collected from the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) 








Countries and years covered 
The countries included in the SPEUDA data-base include the 28 EU member states and four 
EFTA countries. The countries included in the database, and the years covered for each 
country in each original source or dataset, are shown in the table below. 




SAMIP (years covered) 
Austria 2002-2014 2004-2016 1990-2013 
Belgium 2002-2014 2004-2016 1990-2013 
Bulgaria 2002-2014 2007-2016 2007-2013 
Croatia 2002-2014 2013-2016 - 
Cyprus 2002-2014 2004-2016 2004-2013 
Czech Republic 2002-2014 2004-2016 1993-2013 
Denmark 2002-2014 2004-2016 1990-2013 
Estonia 2002-2014 2004-2016 1995-2013 
Finland 2002-2014 2004-2016 1990-2013 
France 2002-2014 2004-2016 1990-2013 
Germany 2002-2014 2004-2016 1990-2013 
Greece 2002-2014 2004-2016 - 
Hungary 2002-2014 2004-2016 1992-2013 
Iceland (EFTA) 2002-2014 - 1995-2013 
Ireland 2002-2014 2004-2016 1990-2013 
Italy 2002-2014 2004-2016 1990-2009 




Lichtenstein (EFTA) 2002-2014 - - 
Lithuania 2002-2014 2004-2016 2004-2013 
Luxembourg 2002-2014 2004-2016 1990-2013 
Malta 2002-2014 2004-2016 2004-2013 
Netherlands 2002-2014 2004-2016 1990-2013 
Norway (EFTA) 2002-2014 - 1990-2013 
Poland 2002-2014 2004-2016 1995-2013 
Portugal 2002-2014 2004-2016 1996-2013 
Romania 2002-2014 2007-2016 2007-2013 
Slovakia 2002-2014 2004-2016 1993-2013 
Slovenia 2002-2014 2004-2016 1992-2013 
Spain 2002-2014 2004-2016 1990-2013 
Sweden 2002-2014 2004-2016 1990-2013 
Switzerland (EFTA) 2002-2014 - 1990-2013 
United Kingdom 2002-2014 2004-2016 1990-2013 
Note: MISSOC health care data are not available for Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Lichtenstein 
 
Time-interval of the data in the original sources and data-sets: 
SSPTW 2002-2014 (two years interval) 
MISSOC 2004-2016 (one year interval) 






Coding of variables  
General coding 
A number indicators in the SPEUDA data-base are equivalent to the indicators provided by 
the primary data sources. However, SPEUDA also includes a large number of operationalized 
and computed (coded) variables. These newly-constructed variables are briefly described 
below. The coding schemes for all indicators are described in the list of indicators below. 
Coverage 
Whether different group categories, i.e. employed or self-employed persons, are covered by 
a specific protection programme is captured by dummy-variables. 
“cover_adj_index”:  the labour force participation rate multiplied by group coverage (ie. 
whether public and private private sectors as well as self-employed persons are covered by 
insurance). 
“lab_tot_partic”:  share of the population participating in the labour market, ranging 
between 0-1. 
Funding 
Funding principles are presented as 1) percentage of earnings paid by the insured; 
percentage of payroll paid by the employer; percentage paid by the government, and 2) the 
contribution of each of these categories as part of the total funding of the benefit 
programme in question. 
Qualifying conditions 
There are different types of qualifying conditions relative to each programme (see List of 
indicators, section 6). 
Amount of benefits 
Benefits are presented as part of previous salary or as flat-rate depending on the 
information provided by the original sources or data-sets. Minimum and maximum amount 
of benefits are calculated as well as minimum and maximum contributions by the insured 






Replacement rate represents the level of benefit provision in case of loss of income. The RR-
variables are calculated as benefit level as a proportion of national income measurements, 
in this case GDP per capita and GNI per capita. 
General Assumptions 
In standardizing programme indicators, the coding is, in some cases, based on assumptions 
about specific details connected to certain measurements. The general assumptions for 
programme-specific indicators are listed below. 
Old age benefits 
When there are two different systems, the older system is coded if this is a legal option for 
the retired person. 
Sick-pay/work injury 
Assumption that recipient is not hospitalized. 
Maternity/parental leave 
Weeks that the father must take out while the mother is on leave are not included in 
duration and benefit calculations. 
Unemployment/sickness/work injury: 
When benefits depend on work record e.g. 3-5 or 5-10 years, it is coded for the longer time 
period. 
Family allowance 
When stated that the child must be younger than X, X-1 is given as age (e.g. age 15 is coded 





Whether payment to citizens abroad is possible – if no info, the assumption is that it is not 
possible. 
Permanent residence/long-term residence – the limit of minimum 5 years of residence is in 
accordance with EU regulation of “long-term residence”. 
Health care 
Information about funding levels missing – instead dummy variable were used to indicate 





List of indicators in SPEUDA 
 




   





(public employees) covered 
by voluntary unemployment 
programme: calculated as 
0=no, 1=yes 
 Employees unem_vol_cov_employees Employees covered by 
voluntary unemployment 




Self-employed covered by 
voluntary unemployment 
programme: calculated as 
0=no, 1=yes 
 Domestic unem_vol_cov_domestic Domestic workers covered 
by voluntary unemployment 
programme: calculated as 
0=no, 1=yes 
 Farmers self employe unem_vol_cov_farmers_self Farmers self-employed 
covered by voluntary 
unemployment programme: 
calculated as 0=no, 1=yes 





covered by voluntary 
unemployment programme: 
calculated as 0=no, 1=yes 





programme: calculated as 
0=no, 1=yes 
 Coverage (index) unem_vol_cov_index Coverage aggregation, 1-7 
 cover_adj_index unem_vol_cov_adj_index Share of labour market 
participation multiplied with 
group coverage (i.e. 
whether public, private and 
self-employed are covered 
by insurance) 
 lab_tot_partic  unem_vol_lab_partic Share of population 
participating in the labour 
market, 0-1 




Percentage of earnings paid 
by the insured  




Percentage of payroll paid 
by the employer  
 Government unem_vol_fund_gov_proc Percentage paid by the 
government  
 any deficits unem_vol_fund_def If the government covers 
deficits, 1=yes, 0=no 
 Insured (part of total) unem_vol_fund_insured_pr
op 
Proportion of funding paid 
by the insured 
 Employer (part of total) unem_vol_fund_employer_
prop 
Proportion of funding paid 
by the employer 
 Government (part of total) unem_vol_fund_gov_prop Proportion of funding paid 
by the government 
Qualifying conditions Work record (weeks) unem_vol_cond_work-
record 
Estimated work record for 
benefits eligibility (weeks) 
 Reference period (weeks) unem_vol_cond_ref-period Estimated time period for 
benefits eligibility (weeks) 




previous salary) of previous salary 
 Benefits 26 weeks unem_vol_ben_26w Benefit level after 26 weeks 
 Minimum benefit unem_vol_ben_min Minimum amount of benefit 
(% of previous salary) 
 Maximum benefit unem_vol_ben_max Maximum amount of 
benefit (% of previous 
salary) 
 Minimum contribution unem_vol_ben_min_contrib Minimum contribution for 
eligibility of benefit 
 Maximum contribution unem_vol_ben_max_contri
b 
Maximum contribution for 
eligibility of benefit 
 Duration (days) unem_vol_ben_dur Duration of benefit (days) 
Raplacement rate variables RR_gdp unem_vol_gdp_rr Replacement rate of benefit 
comparatively to Gross 
Domestic Product/month 
 RR_average income unem_vol_ai_rr Replacement rate of benefit 
comparatively to average 
income/month 
 RR_gni pc unem_vol_gni_rr Replacement rate of benefit 
comparatively to Gross 
National Income/month 
WORK INJURY    





(public employees) covered 
by work injury insurance: 
calculated as 0=no, 1=yes 
 Employees work_injury_cov_employ Employees covered by work 
injury insurance: calculated 
as 0=no, 1=yes 
 Self-employed work_injury_cov_self_empl
oy 
Self-employed covered by 




calculated as 0=no, 1=yes 
 Domestic work_injury_cov_dom Domestic workers covered 
by work injury insurance: 
calculated as 0=no, 1=yes 
 Farmers self-employed work_injury_cov_farmers Self-employed farmers 
covered by work injury 
insurance: calculated as 
0=no, 1=yes 





covered by work injury 
insurance: calculated as 
0=no, 1=yes 
 Universal (all) work_injury_cov_uni Universal coverage of work 
injury insurance: calculated 
as 0=no, 1=yes 
 Coverage (index) work_injury_cov_index Coverage aggregation, 1-7 
 cover_adj_index work_injury_cov_adj_index Share of labour market 
participation multiplied with 
group coverage (ie. whether 
public, private and self-
employed are covered by 
insurance) 
 lab_tot_partic  work_injury_lab_partic Share of population 






If work injury insurance 
programme is conditional 
and/or means-tested for 
employees: calculated as 
0=no, 1=yes 




Percentage of earnings paid 
by the insured  




payroll) _proc by the employer 
 Government work_injury_fund_gov_proc Percentage paid by the 
government 
 Insured (part of total) work_injury_fund_insured_
prop 
Proportion of funding paid 
by the insured 
 Employer (part of total) work_injury_fund_employer
_prop 
Proportion of funding paid 
by the employer 
 Government (part of total) work_injury_fund_gov_prop Proportion of funding paid 
by the government 
 any deficits work_injury_fund_def If government covers 
deficits, 1=yes, 0=no 
Qualifying conditions Work record (weeks) work_inj_cond_work-record Estimated work record for 
benefits eligibility (weeks) 
 Reference period (weeks) work_inj_cond_ref-period Estimated time period of 




Benefits (percentage of 
previous salary) 
work_injury_ben_perc Benefit level as percentage 
of previous salary 
 Benefits 26 weeks work_injury_ben_26w Benefit level after 26 weeks 
 Minimum  work_injury_ben_min Minimum amount of benefit 
per day 
 Maximum   work_injury_ben_max Maximum amount of 
benefit per day 
 Minimum contribution work_injury_ben_min_inc Minimum annual income 
used to calculate benefit 
 Maximum contribution work_injury_ben_max_inc Maximum annual income 
used to calculate benefit 
 Duration (days) work_injury_ben_dur Duration of benefit (days) 




permanent disability or permanent disability 
 Employer liability/labor 
code 
work_injury_ben_liability If workers are protected 
through employer 




Lump-sum or Pension work_injury_per_ben_lump Benefit level in case of 
permanent disability: Lump-
sum or Pension 
 Benefits (percentage of 
previous salary) 
work_injury_per_ben_perc Benefit level as percentage 
of previous salary 
 Minimum work_injury_per_ben_min Minimum amount of benefit 
per day 
 Maximum work_injury_per_ben_max Maximum amount of 
benefit per day 
 Minimum contribution work_injury_per_ben_min_
contrib 
Minimum annual income 
used to calculate benefit 
 Maximum contribution work_injury_per_ben_max_
contrib 
Maximum annual income 
used to calculate benefit 




Benefits for widow or 
widower as lump-sum 
 Survivors Benefits work_injury_surv_ben Benefits for widow or 
widower as percentage of 
previous earnings 
Raplacement rate variables RR_gdp work_injury_gdp_rr Replacement rate of benefit 
comparatively to Gross 
Domestic Product/month 
 RR_average income work_injury_ai_rr Replacement rate of benefit 
comparatively to average 
income/month 
  RR_gni pc work_injury_gni_rr Replacement rate of benefit 





SICKPAY    
Coverage Government employees 
(public employees) 
sick_cov_publ_employ Government employees 
(public employees) covered 
by sickness insurance: 
calculated as 0=no, 1=yes 
 Employees sick_cov_employ Employees covered by 
sickness insurance: 
calculated as 0=no, 1=yes 
 Self-employed sick_cov_self_employ Self-employed covered by 
sickness insurance: 
calculated as 0=no, 1=yes 
 Deomestic sick_cov_jobseekers Jobseekers covered by 
sickness insurance: 
calculated as 0=no, 1=yes 
 Farmers self-employed sick_cov_farmers Self-employed farmers 
covered by sickness 
insurance: calculated as 
0=no, 1=yes 
 Farmers kooperative/agri 
worker 
sick_cov_farmers_koop Farmers kooperative 
covered by sickness 
insurance: calculated as 
0=no, 1=yes 
 Universal (all) sick_cov_uni Universal coverage of 
sickness insurance: 
calculated as 0=no, 1=yes 
 Coverage (index) sick_cov_index Coverage aggregation, 1-7 
 cover_adj_index sick_cov_adj_index Share of labour market 
participation multiplied with 
group coverage (ie. whether 
public, private and self-
employed are covered by 
insurance) 
 lab_tot_partic  sick_lab_partic Share of population 





 Conditions sick_cov_cond Conditions for sickness 
insurance coverage 
Funding Insured (percentage of 
earnings) 
sick_fund_insured_proc Percentage of earnings paid 
by the insured  
 Employer (percentage of 
payroll) 
sick_fund_employer_proc Percentage of earnings paid 
by the employer 
 Government sick_fund_gov_proc Percentage paid by the 
government 
 Insured (part of total) sick_fund_insured_prop Proportion of funding paid 
by the insured 
 Employer (part of total) sick_fund_employer_prop Proportion of funding paid 
by the employer 
 Government (part of total) sick_fund_gov_prop Proportion of funding paid 
by the government 
 Deficits sick_fund_def If government covers 
deficits, 1=yes, 0=no 
 Work record (weeks) sick_cond_work-record Estimated work record for 
benefits eligibility (weeks) 
 Reference period (weeks) sick_cond_ref-period Estimated time period of 
employment for benefits 
eligibility (weeks) 
Benefits Benefits (percentage of 
previous salary) 
sick_ben_perc Benefits as percentage of 
previous salary paid initially 
or per month if flat-rate 
 Benefits 26 weeks sick_ben_26w Benefit level after 26 weeks 
 Minimum amoun (month) sick_ben_min Minimum amount of benefit 
per month 
 Maximum (month) sick_ben_max Maximum amount of 




 Minimum contribution sick_ben_min_inc Minimum annual income 
used to calculate benefit 
 Maximum contribution sick_ben_max_inc Maximum annual income 
used to calculate benefit 
 Duration sick_ben_dur Duration of benefit 
 Employer liability/labor 
code 
sick_ben_liability If workers are protected 
through employer 
liability/labor codes, 0=no, 
1=yes  
 Medical benefits  sick_ben_medical Medical benefits (pecentage 
paid by 
employer/government) 
Raplacement rate variables RR_gdp sick_gdp_rr Replacement rate of benefit 
comparatively to Gross 
Domestic Product/month 
 RR_average income sick_ai_rr Replacement rate of benefit 
comparatively to average 
income/month 
  RR_gni pc sick_gni_rr Replacement rate of benefit 
comparatively to Gross 
National Income/month 
OLD AGE     





(public employees) covered 
by earnings-related 
pensions: calculated as 
0=no, 1=yes 
 Employees old_earning_cov_employ Employees covered by 
earnings-related pension: 
calculated as 0=no, 1=yes 
 Self-employed old_earning_cov_self_empl
oy 





calculated as 0=no, 1=yes 
 Domestic old_earning_cov_dom Domestic workers covered 
by earnings-related pension: 
calculated as 0=no, 1=yes 
 Farmer self-employed old_earning_cov_farmers Self-employed farmers 
covered by earnings-related 
pension: calculated as 0=no, 
1=yes 





covered by earnings-related 
pension: calculated as 0=no, 
1=yes 
 Universal (all) old_earning_cov_uni Universial coverage of 
earnings-related pension: 
calculated as 0=no, 1=yes 
 Coverage (index) old_earning_cov_index Coverage aggregation, 1-7 
 cover_adj_index old_earning_cov_adj_index Share of labor market 
participation multiplied with 
group coverage (ie. whether 
public, private and self-
employed are covered by 
insurance) 
 lab_tot_partic  old_earning_lab_partic Share of population 
participating in the labor 
market, 0-1 
 Condition/means-tested old_earning_cov_means Conditional/means-testing 
of employees: calculated as 
0=no, 1=yes 




Percentage of earnings paid 
by the insured (for earnings-
related pension 
programme) 
 Employer (percentage of old_earning_fund_employer Percentage of payroll paid 




payroll) _proc earnings-related pension 
programme) 




 Deficits old_earning_fund_def If government covers 
deficits, 1=yes, 0=no 
 Insured (part of total) old_earning_fund_insured_
prop 
Proportion of funding paid 
by the insured 
 Employer (part of total) old_earning_fund_employer
_prop 
Proportion of funding paid 
by the employer 
 Government (part of total) old_earning_fund_gov_prop Proportion of funding paid 
by the government 
 Male Standard retirement 
age 
old_retire_age_male Male Standard retirement 
age 
 Female Standard retirement 
age 
old_retire_age_female Female Standard retirement 
age 
 Minimum contribution 
years/work record 
old_earning_con_work_rec Minimum work record for 
recieving earnings-related 
old-age benefits 
Benefits Base pension (month) old_base_ben Benefit level for basic 
pension programme (per 
month)  
 Benefits (per month) old_earning_ben Income related pensions 
benefits (percentage of 
previous income, per 
month)  
 Reference earnings (for 
calculating benefits) 
old_earning_ben_ref_earn Reference earnings for 
calculating benefits 





 Maximum (per month) old_earning_ben_max Maximum amount of 
benefit per month 
 Minimum contribution old_earning_ben_min_cont Minimum contribution used 
to calculate benefit 
 Maximum contribution old_earning_ben_max_cont Maximum contribution used 
to calculate benefit 




Guarenteed means tested 
pension 
 Survivors pension (as 
percentage of spouse's 
pension) 
old_earning_ben_survavior Survivors pension (as 
percentage of spouse's 
pension) 




Replacement rate of 
guarenteed old age benefit 
comparatively to Gross 
Domestic Product/month 
 RR_gdp (income related) old_earning_gdp_rr_income Replacement rate of income 
related old age benefit 
comparatively to Gross 
Domestic Product/month 
 RR_average income old_earning_ai_rr Replacement rate of benefit 
comparatively to average 
income/month 




Replacement rate of 
guarenteed old age benefit 
comparatively to Gross 
National Income/month 
  RR_gni pc (income related) old_earning_gni_rr_income Replacement rate of income 
related old age benefit 








Coverage Government employees 
(public employees) 
parental_cov_publ_employ Government employees 
(public employees) covered 
by maternity/paternity 
benefits: calculated as 0=no, 
1=yes 
 Employees parental_cov_employ Employees covered by 
maternity/paternity 
benefits: calculated as 0=no, 
1=yes 
 Self-employed parental_cov_self_employ Self-employed covered by 
maternity/paternity 
benefits: calculated as 0=no, 
1=yes 
 Domestic parental_cov_dom Domestic workers covered 
by maternity/paternity 
benefits: calculated as 0=no, 
1=yes 
 Farmers self-employed parental_cov_farmers Self-employed farmers 
covered by 
maternity/paternity 
benefits: calculated as 0=no, 
1=yes 
 Farmers kooperative/agri 
worker 
parental_cov_farmers_koop Farmers kooperative 
covered by 
maternity/paternity 
benefits: calculated as 0=no, 
1=yes 
 Universal (all) parental_cov_uni Universal coverage of 
maternity/paternity 
benefits: calculated as 0=no, 
1=yes 
 Coverage (index) parental_cov_index Coverage aggregation, 1-7 
 cover_adj_index parental_cov_adj_index Share of labour market 
participation multiplied with 




public, private and self-
employed are covered by 
insurance) 
 lab_tot_partic  parental_lab_partic Share of population 
participating in the labour 
market, 0-1 




Percentage of earnings paid 
by the insured  




Percentage of earnings paid 
by the employer 
 Government parental_fund_gov_proc Percentage paid by the 
government 
 Insured (part of total) parental_fund_insured_pro
p 
Proportion of funding paid 
by the insured 
 Employer (part of total) parental_fund_employer_pr
op 
Proportion of funding paid 
by the employer 
 Government (part of total) parental_fund_gov_prop Proportion of funding paid 
by the government 
    
Qualifying conditions Work record (weeks) parental_cond_work-record Estimated work record for 
benefits eligibility (weeks) 
 Reference period (weeks) parental_cond_ref-period Estimated time period of 
employment for benefits 
eligibility (weeks) 
Benefits Benefits (percentage of 
previous salary or per 
month if flat-rate) 
parental_ben_perc Benefits as percentage of 
previous salary paid initially 
or per month if flat-rate 
 Benefits 26 weeks parental_ben_26w Benefit level after 26 weeks 
 Minimum (month) parental_ben_min Minimum amount of benefit 
per month 




benefit per month 
 Minimum contribution parental_ben_min_cont Minimum contribution used 
to calculate benefits 
 Maximum contribution parental_ben_max_cont Maximum contribution used 
to calculate benefits 
 Duration parental_ben_dur Duration of benefit 
 Employer liability/labor 
code 
parental_ben_liability If workers are protected 
through employer 
liability/labor codes, 0=no, 
1=yes  
 Medical benefits  parental_ben_medical Medical benefits (pecentage 
paid by 
employer/government) 
Replacement rate variables RR_gdp parental_gdp_rr Replacement rate of benefit 
comparatively to Gross 
Domestic Product/month 
 RR_average income parental_ai_rr Replacement rate of benefit 
comparatively to average 
income/month 
  RR_gni pc parental_gni_rr Replacement rate of benefit 
comparatively to Gross 
National Income/month 
FAMILY ALLOWANCE    





(public employees) covered 
by maternity/paternity 
benefits: calculated as 0=no, 
1=yes 
 Employees fam_allow_cov_employ Employees covered by 
maternity/paternity 





 Self-employed fam_allow_cov_self_employ Self-employed covered by 
maternity/paternity 
benefits: calculated as 0=no, 
1=yes 
 Domestic fam_allow_cov_dom Domestic workers covered 
by maternity/paternity 
benefits: calculated as 0=no, 
1=yes 
 Farmers self-employed fam_allow_cov_farmers Self-employed farmers 
covered by 
maternity/paternity 
benefits: calculated as 0=no, 
1=yes 







benefits: calculated as 0=no, 
1=yes 
 Universal (all) fam_allow_cov_uni Universal coverage of 
maternity/paternity 
benefits: calculated as 0=no, 
1=yes 
 Coverage (index) fam_allow_cov_index Coverage aggregation, 1-7 
 cover_adj_index fam_allow_cov_adj_index Share of labour market 
participation multiplied with 
group coverage (ie. whether 
public, private and self-
employed are covered by 
insurance) 
 lab_tot_partic  fam_allow_lab_partic Share of population 
participating in the labour 
market, 0-1 









Percentage of earnings paid 
by the insured  




Percentage of earnings paid 
by the employer 
 Government fam_allow_fund_gov_proc Percentage paid by the 
government 
 Deficits fam_allow_fund_def If government covers 
deficits, 1=yes, 0=no 
 Insured (part of total) fam_allow_fund_insured_pr
op 
Proportion of funding paid 
by the insured 
 Employer (part of total) fam_allow_fund_employer_
prop 
Proportion of funding paid 
by the employer 
 Government (part of total) fam_allow_fund_gov_prop Proportion of funding paid 
by the government 
Qualifying conditions Max age of children fam_allow_cond_child_allo
w_age 
Child allowance (maximum 
age of children) 
 Max income fam_allow_cond_max_inco
me 
Max income, means-testing, 
for benefit eligibility 
 School fam_allow_cond_school If the child must attend 
school (1=yes, 0=no)  
 Health fam_allow_cond_health If the child must fullfill any 
specific health standard 
(1=yes, 0=no)  
 Work record (weeks) fam_allow_cond_work-
record 
Estimated work record for 
benefits eligibility (weeks) 
Benefits Benefits (per child and 
month) 
fam_allow_ben_child_allow Child allowance/benefits 
(per child and month) 




If child allowance is means 





Replacement rate variables RR_gdp fam_allow_gdp_rr Replacement rate of benefit 
comparatively to Gross 
Domestic Product/month 
 RR_average income fam_allow_ai_rr Replacement rate of benefit 
comparatively to average 
income/month 
  RR_gni pc fam_allow_gni_rr Replacement rate of benefit 
comparatively to Gross 
National Income/month 
HEALTH CARE    
 Basic principles   





(public employees) covered 
by Health care insurance: 
calculated as 0=no, 1=yes 
 Employees Missoc_health_cov_employ
ees 
Employees covered by 
covered by Health care 




Self-employed covered by 
covered by Health care 




Domestic workers covered 
by covered by Health care 




Jobseekers covered by basic 
covered by Health care 
insurance: calculated as 
0=no, 1=yes 
 Universal (all) Missoc_health_cov_uni Universial coverage of 
covered by Health care 





 Coverage (index) Missoc_health_cov_index Coverage aggregation, 1-6 
 cover_adj_index Missoc_health_cov_adj_ind
ex 
Share of labour market 
participation multiplied with 
group coverage (ie. whether 
public, private and self-
employed are covered by 
insurance) 
 lab_tot_partic  Missoc_health_lab_partic Share of population 
participating in the labour 
market, 0-1 
 Compulsory Missoc_health_cov_comp If health insurance is 
compulsary, 1=yes, 0=no 
 Voluntary Missoc_health_cov_vol If health insurance is 
voluntary, 1=yes, 0=no 
Funding Employees Missoc_health_fund_emplo
yee 
If employees contributes to 
the funding, 1=yes, 0=no  




If the self-employed 
contributes to the funding, 
1=yes, 0=no 




If the employer contributes 
to the funding, 1=yes, 0=no 
 Government Missoc_health_fund_gov If the government 
contributes to the funding, 
1=yes, 0=no 
 Insured (part of total) Missoc_health_fund_insure
d_prop 
Proportion of funding paid 
by the insured 
 Self-employed (part of total) Missoc_health_fund_self_e
mploy_prop 
Proportion of funding paid 
by the self-employed 
 Employer (part of total) Missoc_health_fund_emplo
yer_prop 
Proportion of funding paid 




 Government (part of total) Missoc_health_fund_gov_pr
op 
Proportion of funding paid 
by the government 
 Deficits Missoc_health_fund_def Responsibility for deficits in 
funding 
Qualifying conditions Qualifying period Missoc_health_cond_period Time before eligible to 
insurance 
 Residents Missoc_health_cond_res Insured must be reside in 
the country, 1=yes/0=no 
Benefits Duration of benefits Missoc_health_ben_dur How long service is available 
for insured 
 Payment of doctor Missoc_health_ben_pay_do
ctor 
Patient charge for doctor 




Minimum patient charge for 
treatment, per session 
(percentage) 




Minimum patient charge for 
treatment, per session 
(amount) 




Maximum patient charge 
for treatment, per session 
(percentage) 




Maximum patient charge 
for treatment, per session 
(amount) 
 Max cost per year 
/reduction for high cost) 
Missoc_health_ben_red Maximum cost for a patient 
per year 
 Hospitalisation: patient 
charge min % (day) 
Missoc_health_ben_hosp_c
harge_min_share 
Minimum patient charge for 
hospitalisation, per day 
(percentage) 
 Hospitalisation: patient 
charge min amount (day) 
Missoc_health_ben_hosp_c
harge_min 
Minimum patient charge for 





 Hospitalisation: patient 
charge max % (day) 
Missoc_health_ben_hosp_c
harge_max_share 
Maximum patient charge 
for hospitalisation, per day 
(percentage) 
  Hospitalisation: patient 
charge max amount (day) 
Missoc_health_ben_hosp_c
harge_max 
Maximum patient charge 




   
Qualifying conditions Nationality Missoc_min_cond_nationali
ty 
Nationality requirements for 
eligibility, 1=yes, 0=no 
 Resident Missoc_min_cond_resident Obligation to reside in 





Permanent residence, or 
long-term residence for 
minimum 5 years, obligation 
for immigrants, 1=yes, 0=no 
Benefits Sasi (assistance single adult) Samip_min_ben_single Social assistance standard 
rates for a single adult 
person below 
retirement age and without 
children. Average monthly 
amounts. 
Excluding housing costs, 
special needs benefits and 
occasional 
payments. 
 Salp (assistance lone parent 
two children) 
Samip_min_ben_lone_par Same as SAsi but for a lone 
parent type-case with two 
children. See 
documentation for details. 
 Safa (assistance two parents 
two children) 
Samip_min_ben_two_par Same as SAsi but for a two-
parent family with two 
children. See 




 SAsiy Samip_min_ben_Sasiy Same as SAsi but yearly 
amounts 
 SAlpy Samip_min_ben_Salpy Same as SAlp but yearly 
amounts. 
 SAfay Samip_min_ben_Safay Same as SAfa but yearly 
amounts. 
 SAavey Samip_min_ben_Saavey The average of SAsiy, SAlpy, 
and SAfay. 
 CSUPPlp Samip_min_ben_CSUPPlp Child supplement for the 
lone parent type-case. 
Average monthly amounts 
 CSUPPfa Samip_min_ben_CSUPPfa Child supplement for the 
two parent type-case. 
Average monthly amounts. 
 HSUPPsi Samip_min_ben_HSUPPsi Housing supplement for the 
single person without 
children. Average monthly 
amounts. 
 HSUPPlp Samip_min_ben_HSUPPlp Housing supplement for the 
lone parent type-case. 
Average monthly amounts 
 HSUPPfa Samip_min_ben_HSUPPfa Housing supplement for the 
two parent type-case. 
Average monthly amounts 
 TCREDsi Samip_min_ben_TCREDsi Refundable tax credits for 
the single person without 
children. Average monthly 
amounts. 
 TCREDlp Samip_min_ben_TCREDlp Refundable tax credits for 
the lone parent type-case. 
Average monthly amounts 
 TCREDfa Samip_min_ben_TCREDfa Refundable tax credits for 




Average monthly amounts 
 OTHsi Samip_min_ben_OTHsi Other benefits beside those 
above for the single person 
household without children. 
Average monthly amounts. 
 OTHlp Samip_min_ben_OTHlp Other benefits beside those 
above for the lone parent 
type-case. Average monthly 
amounts. 
 OTHfa Samip_min_ben_OTHfa Other benefits beside those 
above for the two-parent 
type-case. Average monthly 
amounts. 
 CSUPPlpy Samip_min_ben_CSUPPlpy Same as CSUPPlp but yearly 
amounts. 
 CSUPPfay Samip_min_ben_ Same as CSUPPfa but yearly 
amounts 
 HSUPPsiy Samip_min_ben_HSUPPsiy Same as HSUPPsi but yearly 
amounts. 
 HSUPPlpy Samip_min_ben_HSUPPlpy Same as HSUPPlp but yearly 
amounts. 
 HSUPPfay Samip_min_ben_HSUPPfay Same as HSUPPfa but yearly 
amounts. 
 TCREDsiy Samip_min_ben_TCREDsiy Same as TCREDsi but yearly 
amounts. 
 TCREDlpy Samip_min_ben_TCREDlpy Same as TCREDlp but yearly 
amounts. 
 TCREDfay Samip_min_ben_TCREDfay Same as TCREDfa but yearly 
amounts. 





 OTHlpy Samip_min_ben_OTHlpy Same as OTHlp but yearly 
amounts. 
 OTHfay Samip_min_ben_OTHfay Same as OTHfa but yearly 
amounts 
 MIPsi Samip_min_ben_MIPsi Minimum income 
protection for the single 
person household without 
children. Average monthly 
amounts. The sum of SAsi, 
HSUPPsi, TCREDsi, and 
OTHsi. 
 MIPlp Samip_min_ben_MIPlp Minimum income 
protection for the lone 
parent type-case. Average 
monthly amounts. The sum 
of SAlp, CSUPPlp, HSUPPlp, 
TCREDlp, and OTHlp. 
 MIPfa Samip_min_ben_MIPfa Minimum income 
protection for the two-
parent family type-case. 
Average monthly amounts. 
The sum of SAfa, CSUPPfa, 
HSUPPfa, TCREDfa, and 
OTHfa. 
 MIPsiy Samip_min_ben_MIPsiy Same as MIPsi but yearly 
amounts. 
 MIPlpy Samip_min_ben_MIPlpy Same as MIPlp but yearly 
amounts. 
 MIPfay Samip_min_ben_MIPfay Same as MIPfa but yearly 
amounts. 
 MIPavey Samip_min_ben_MIPavey The average of MIPsiy, 
MIPlpy, and MIPfay. 
 FAlp Samip_min_ben_Falp Family Assistance for the 
lone parent type-case. Same 




protection but less housing 
supplements (MIPlp-
HSUPPlp). Average monthly 
amounts. 
 FAfa Samip_min_ben_Fafa Family Assistance for the 
twoparent family type-case. 
Same as Minimum income 
protection but less housing 
supplements (MIPlp-
HSUPPlp). Average monthly 
amounts. 
 FAlpy Samip_min_ben_Falpy Same as FAlp but yearly 
amounts 
 FAfay Samip_min_ben_Fafay Same as FAfa but yearly 
amounts. 
  FAavey Samip_min_ben_Faavey The average of FAlpy and 
FAfay. 
General indicators (for RR 
calculation) 
   
 Gdp per capita per month  Gross National Product per 
capita/month 
 Gni pc per month LCU  Gross National income per 
capita per month in local 
currency 






This project has received funding from the European 
Union’s Horizon 2020 research & innovation 
programme under grant agreement no 727072
The REMINDER project is exploring the 
economic, social, institutional and policy factors 
that have shaped the impacts of free movement 
in the EU and public debates about it.
The project is coordinated from COMPAS and 
includes participation from 14 consortium 
partners in 9 countries across Europe
